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ABSTRACT 
Public familiarity with basic scientific concepts and principles has been proposed as 
essential for effective democratic decision-making (Miller 1998). Empirical research, 
however, finds that public „scientific literacy‟ is generally low, falling well short of 
what normative criteria would consider „acceptable‟.  This has prompted calls to 
better engage, educate and inform the public on scientific matters, with the 
additional, usually implicit assumption that a knowledgeable citizenry should 
express more supportive and favourable attitudes toward science. Research 
investigating the notion that „to know science is to love it‟ has provided only weak 
empirical support and has itself been criticised for representing science and 
technology as a unified and homogenous entity. In practice, it is argued, how 
knowledge impacts on the favourability of attitudes will depend on a multiplicity of 
factors, not least of which is the particular area of science in question and the 
technologies to which it gives rise (Evans and Durant, 1992). 
This paper uses a new method for examining the knowledge-attitude nexus 
on a prominent area of 21st century science - biotechnology. The idea that greater 
scientific knowledge can engender change in the favourability of attitudes toward 
specific areas of science is investigated using data from the 2000 British Social 
Attitudes Survey and the 1999 Wellcome Consultative Panel on Gene Therapy.  
Together the surveys measure public opinion on particular applications of genetic 
technologies, including gene therapy and the use of genetic data, as well as more 
general attitudes towards genetic research. We focus our analysis on how two 
different measures of knowledge impact on these attitudes; one a general measure of 
scientific knowledge, the other relating specifically to knowledge of modern genetic 
science.  
We investigate what impact these knowledge domains have on attitudes 
towards biotechnology using a regression based modelling technique (Bartels 1996; 
Althaus 1998; Sturgis 2003). Controlling for a range of socio-demographic 
characteristics, we provide estimates of what collective and individual opinion 
would look like if everyone were as knowledgeable as the currently best-informed 
members of the general public on the knowledge domains in question. Our findings 
demonstrate that scientific knowledge does appear to have an important role in 
determining individual and group attitudes to genetic science. However, we find no 
support for a simple „deficit model‟ of public understanding, as the nature of the 
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relationship itself depends on the application of biotechnology in question and the 
social location of the individual.  
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PUBLICS, ATTITUDES AND SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE 
A concern to document and assess the public‟s „understanding‟ of science now has a 
longstanding pedigree within mainstream social science (Irwin and Wynne, 1996; 
Sturgis and Allum, in press). This, it has been argued, emerges out of a „scientistic‟ 
worldview, which sees basic scientific competence as essential for citizens to 
meaningfully engage with the increasing number of scientific and technological 
developments that impact on everyday lives. From this perspective, a knowledgeable 
citizenry is vital to truly democratic decision-making (Durant, Evans and Thomas, 
1992; Miller, 1998). Conversely, a lack of knowledge is seen to impede the public‟s 
ability to understand and engage in debate on scientific developments, particularly 
in areas characterised by complexity and disagreement among experts (Doble, 1995), 
so-called „science in the making‟ (Shapin, 1992). 
Recent empirical research in this area has sought to measure levels of 
scientific knowledge within the general public through survey research. Prominent 
in this regard has been Miller (1983; 1987; 1998) who develops the notion of „civic 
scientific literacy‟ to investigate public comprehension of basic scientific constructs, 
the process of scientific enquiry and the impact of science on society.  Miller‟s 
analysis of US and EU survey data reveals that, in 1992, 73 percent of Europeans and 
63 percent of American respondents could not be classed as „literate‟ on his main 
dimensions of scientific knowledge (Miller, 1998).  Similarly, only 12 percent of 
Americans and 5 percent of Europeans fulfilled Miller‟s criteria for being fully 
„scientifically literate‟, by reaching a threshold level on a battery of scientific 
knowledge items. In Europe, the highest percentage of „fully literate‟ adults was in 
Britain at only 10 percent, underpinning Miller‟s conclusion that for healthy 
democratic systems, “there can be little doubt that the current levels of civic scientific 
literacy are too low” (1998 p.219).    
While maintaining that scientific knowledge can be measured via surveys, 
Durant, Evans and Thomas (1992) reject the notion of an arbitrary threshold 
signalling „understanding‟ of science and all the normative connotations that go with 
this idea. They measure scientific understanding among the public by ranking scores 
on two principle underlying dimensions; the factual or theoretical contents of science 
and the „process‟ of scientific inquiry. While the former concerns factual or „textbook‟ 
scientific knowledge, the latter relates to the rationale and processes underlying 
scientific enquiry. Their scale of scientific knowledge incorporates both these 
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dimensions into a single variable which they find to be positively associated with 
self-reported interest in science and in hypothesised directions with socio-
demographic variables such as educational level, age, gender and social class. In 
their study, the population average on this measure was less than 50 percent of items 
answered correctly (Durant, Evans and Thomas, ibid).  
For some, findings of this nature are taken as strong empirical confirmations 
of the existence of a „scientifically illiterate‟ public and provide the first pillar in the 
construction of the pervasive „deficit model‟ of public understanding of science 
(Irwin and Wynne 1996; Sturgis and Allum, 2001). The deficit model sees public 
resistance to science and technology as underpinned by ignorance, superstition and 
fear. Public scepticism about technological innovations such as nuclear energy, 
microwave cooking and genetic science would be markedly reduced if citizens were 
better able to grasp the science upon which they are based. That is, a judgement, 
when informed by scientific fact, would tend to be more favourable and consistent 
with expert opinion than one expressed without recourse to such „objective‟ 
knowledge. And indeed, empirical studies have, on the whole, found the 
relationship between formal scientific knowledge and attitude toward science to be 
significant and positive, though moderate in magnitude (Evans and Durant, 1992; 
Sturgis and Allum, in press). Such claims about the status and role of scientific 
knowledge in the genesis and trajectory of public opinion have, however, been 
subject to powerful and sustained criticism on a number of levels.  
First, what it means to be „knowledgeable‟ about science continues to be 
strongly contested. There is growing consensus that scientific knowledge extends 
beyond the simple learning of „facts‟ that can be straightforwardly defined and 
measured (Irwin and Wynne, 1996). What has been referred to as the „contextual 
model‟ of public understanding of science highlights the sophistication and value of 
lay understandings of science that can exist in the absence of formal scientific 
knowledge (Durant, Hansen and Bauer, 1999). From this perspective, privileging 
formal scientific knowledge as the sole basis of rational preference formation leads us 
to overlook other knowledge domains that may be equally, or even more important 
determinants of attitudes to science. Wynne (1991) and Yearley (2000), for instance, 
highlight the influence of „local knowledge‟ in determining public favourability to 
science and technology. Bauer, Petkova and Boyadjieva (2000), on the other hand, 
argue that “institutional knowledge” - how science is funded, regulated and 
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embedded within more general political systems – might be the most important 
determinant of public attitudes.  
A second line of critique of the deficit model relates to the idea that ignorance 
of science may actually be entirely rational, given competing demands on time and 
cognitive resources (Simon, 1978). To be fully cognisant of the „facts‟ of science 
would demand more time and motivation than is generally available to the average 
individual in a lifetime, even leaving aside competing demands on time through 
work, family and leisure activities. Faced with the impossibility of being fully 
knowledgeable about science, people become, in Downs‟ memorable phrase, 
“rationally ignorant” (Downs, 1957).  
The consequences of rational ignorance, however, need not be uniformly dire 
for either the individual or society.  In the absence of relevant information, members 
of the public have recourse to a range of information „short-cuts‟ that act as effective 
surrogates for formal knowledge in decision making. Contextual cues, or everyday 
experience, may be used by individuals in order to reach a judgement that articulates 
with their intrinsic values and interests, neither of which are predicated on 
understanding scientific facts (Kerr, Cunningham-Burley and Amos, 1998).  
This brings us to a final, central criticism of the deficit model – that general 
attitudes toward science are of highly dubious ontological status. When the range of 
practices and activities falling under the general umbrella of „science‟ are so 
heterogeneous, is it really possible to say anything meaningful about public 
preferences at this aggregated level? By way of example, imagine an individual who 
is strongly opposed to nuclear power, indifferent towards nanotechnology but 
strongly in favour of gene therapy. How should we characterise this individual‟s 
„general attitude‟ toward science? A simple average would make them overall 
indifferent, yet this would surely not be an adequate characterisation of their actual 
opinions. Such problems have led some to claim that generalised attitudes to science 
as a whole are of only symbolic value, reflecting individuals‟ beliefs about the merits 
of discovery, progress and open-minded enquiry. To understand how formal 
scientific knowledge impacts upon public resistance to science and its technological 
implementation, specific areas of science and technology must be examined.  
In this paper we focus on the relationship between knowledge and attitude in 
a specific area of science – biotechnology. We begin by reviewing extant empirical 
research on public knowledge of and attitudes toward biotechnology. We then 
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describe the data upon which our analyses are based, set forth our analytical strategy 
and present the results of our analyses. We conclude by discussing the implications 
of our results for an understanding of the ways in which public attitudes to this area 
of science and technology are underpinned by „general‟ and „domain-specific‟ 
scientific knowledge. 
 
KNOWLEDGE AND ATTITUDES TO BIOTECHNOLOGY  
Biotechnology represents a new and rapidly evolving area of scientific 
inquiry and technological innovation. In the thirty or so years since it entered public 
consciousness, it has raised profound moral, ethical and political questions which 
remain prominently unresolved today. In recent years, a series of biotechnological 
applications have succeeded in capturing the public‟s attention through widespread 
media coverage, with controversies over GM crops and food, animal and human 
cloning and gene therapy being notable examples.  The arguments for advancing 
public understanding of, and engagement with, biotechnology echo those made for 
science as a whole; promoting public understanding of genetic science is seen as an 
essential prerequisite for democratically based policy making and informed public 
decision making in this area (Agricultural and Environmental Biotechnology 
Commission, 2001; Nuffield Council on Bioethics, 1993).  The public‟s grasp of 
human genetic applications, in particular, is set to take on increased importance as 
techniques such as genetic testing and gene therapy become increasingly 
commonplace in the 21st Century (Department of Health, 2003).  So how have citizens 
tended to react to the increasing proliferation of technologies emanating from 
modern genetic science? 
Opinion poll data over the past ten to twenty years – focussing as it does on 
the United States and Europe - reveals a sceptical but not overwhelmingly hostile 
public response to the dawning genomic revolution.  In the 1997 Biotech survey, only 
about 7 percent of the German public could be characterised as outright opponents 
or proponents of genetic engineering, with many undecided about whether its 
applications are, on the whole, good or bad (Hampel, Pfenning and Peters, 2000).  In 
2002, less than half of Europeans (44 percent) were „optimistic‟ about biotechnology, 
agreeing that it will improve our way of life within the next twenty years (Gaskell et 
al. 2003a).  
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As might be expected of such a heterogeneous area of science and technology, 
public attitudes are actually quite nuanced, differentiating between different 
applications according to their risk, moral acceptability and usefulness to society. A 
majority of Europeans encourage and accept biotechnology applications that have 
clear medical benefits for the diagnosis and treatment of human disease, including 
the cloning of human cells and tissues and genetic testing for inherited disease 
(Gaskell et al. 2003a; Pardo, Midden and Miller, 2002; Hampel et al. 2000). If, 
however, these same technologies are applied in different contexts - genetic tests to 
decide whether to continue a pregnancy, cloning to create a new human being - 
survey evidence reveals public opinion to be markedly oppositional (Human 
Genetics Commission, 2001; MORI, 2003a). Public disquiet is also evident for 
biotechnology applications that involve the genetic modification of animals or the 
transfer of genes between animal species (Hampel et al. 2000). Whilst a majority of 
Europeans in the 1996 Eurobarometer agreed that such applications might be useful, 
there were strong reservations about the risks and moral acceptability of such 
research (Pardo et al. 2002).   
The genetic modification of crops and use of biotechnology in food 
production, the so-called „green-biotechnologies‟ have been the best documented 
source of public anxiety toward genomics. In Germany, over half of the surveyed 
public rejected the use of genetic engineering to improve the flavour or appearance 
of their food (Hampel et al. 2000). And, although time series data suggests that the 
British public have become increasingly ambivalent about GM applications in recent 
years (MORI, 2003b; Gaskell et al. 2003b), a majority still rated GM crops and foods 
as risky and of limited usefulness in the 2002 Eurobarometer (Gaskell et al. 2003a),  
How far can these public appraisals of biotechnology and its applications be 
seen as judgements based on understanding or ignorance of the underlying science? 
First let us consider evidence relating to the distribution of what Turney (1995a; 
1995b) refers to as the “genetic literacy” of the public. Genetic literacy encompasses 
the background knowledge citizens are able to draw upon in order to evaluate 
biotechnological applications. Those familiar with survey based investigations of 
public awareness of politics (Delli Carpini and Keeter 1996; Bennett 1988) and science 
in general (Durant, Evans and Thomas 1992; Miller, 1998) will not be surprised to 
learn that European publics score poorly on factual knowledge batteries on genetic 
science. Certainly, members of the public seem to regard themselves as ill-informed; 
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only 2 percent of respondents in the 1997 German Biotech survey rated their 
knowledge of genetic engineering as „very good‟, with a majority conceding they 
knew nothing about it at all (Hampel et al. 2000).  And, although based on a self-
selecting sample, the recent GM Nation? consultation exercise in the  UK revealed 
that a majority of respondents understood very little about genetic modification, 
with the arguments surrounding its application being widely perceived as 
meaningless in the context of everyday lives (Department of Trade and Industry, 
2003).  Americans, at least, appear to have more confidence in their understanding of 
genetics; in 1987, two-thirds of the American public felt they understood the term 
„genetic engineering‟ (Office of Technology Assessment, 1987), whilst in the 2001 
National Science Foundation Survey, 65 percent of Americans correctly answered 
that the father‟s genes determine a child‟s sex and 45 percent gave an acceptable 
definition of DNA (National Science Foundation, 2002). 
Further evidence relating to public knowledge around biotechnology comes 
from the Eurobarometer survey series. On a nine item scale of biological (including 
genetic) knowledge on the 2002 Eurobarometer survey, the mean score in the UK 
was only 5.3, compared to a European average of 4.9 (Gaskell et al. 2003a). Given that 
the answers to these questions should be known by someone with high school level 
biology, this population average is hardly impressive. And, furthermore, as a mean 
score we also know that a large proportion of the population scored considerably 
lower than this. Combining biological knowledge scores with information about 
public awareness of biotechnology, Pardo et al (2002) find that only one in five 
Europeans could be judged well-informed about biotechnology in 1996-7, with 45 
percent of respondents both unaware of, and poorly informed about, basic 
biotechnology concepts.  In 2002, only around one-quarter of UK citizens could be 
classified as an „engaged public‟, using an index of engagement based on awareness, 
biology knowledge and intended behaviour, a figure which showed little variation 
across the EU (Gaskell et al. 2003a).  A German survey assessing the public‟s factual 
knowledge of genetic engineering found that, on average, only 7.4 out of 20 multiple-
choice questions were answered correctly. The authors note that, while this score was 
barely above what would be expected using a guessing strategy, members of the 
public actually seemed to be applying systematic misunderstandings of basic biology 
in their responses to these questions (Pfister, Böhm and Jungermann, 2000).  
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We would appear, then, to have the raw materials necessary for the 
construction of the deficit model; a broadly disinterested and ignorant public that are 
in many areas resistant, even hostile, to biotechnological applications. What 
empirical evidence is there, though, of a causal link between knowledge levels and 
expressed preferences toward modern genetic science?  Hampel et al. (2000) find that 
Germans who rate their own knowledge levels as „good‟ are more likely to be 
proponents of genetic engineering than those with less self-perceived knowledge. 
However, self-rated knowledge showed only a weak correlation with attitudes 
towards genetic engineering in this study and, furthermore, subjective appraisals of 
knowledge have been found to correspond poorly with factual knowledge of genetic 
engineering, confounded as they are by people‟s interest and enthusiasm for the 
subject (Pfister et al. 2000). 
Most published work assessing the impact factual knowledge has on 
attitudes towards biotechnology has been carried out on the Eurobarometer surveys.  
Comparing „engaged‟ or knowledgeable respondents with those less well informed 
about biotechnology, Gaskell et al. (2003a) find differences in attitudes that are 
independent of educational background. On the whole, the engaged public were 
significantly more likely to find applications of biotechnology morally acceptable 
and useful.  Being well-informed did, however, have less effect on public appraisals 
of risk, suggesting that risks are perceived but tolerated by more knowledgeable 
citizens. A similar pattern was found in the 1996 survey, where public knowledge 
and awareness of biotechnology was unrelated to the perceived risks of 
biotechnology but showed a moderate, positive correlation (0.25) with an index of 
perceived benefits (Pardo et al. 2002).    
While the idea that knowledge of biotechnology fosters a more positive 
outlook does find some empirical support in these studies, there is also evidence that 
the relationship may work in the opposite direction, depending on how questions are 
framed. Pardo et al (2002) find that, while members of the informed public perceive 
the benefits of biotechnology most favourably, they were less convinced of the 
potential biotechnology has to improve quality of life. Similarly, Midden et al. (2002) 
find the better informed public more likely to have negative expectations about the 
outcomes of biotechnology over the next twenty years. And, although based on a 
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knowledge scale that would appear more a measure of attitude1, MORI report that 
respondents with high knowledge were most critical about the wider uses of genetic 
information by employers and insurers (HGC, 2001).   
A second strand of evidence on the relation between knowledge of, and 
attitude toward, biotechnology comes from an ambitious panel study conducted in 
Great Britain by the National Centre for Social Research and the Wellcome Trust 
(Stratford et al. 2002).  This study aimed to assess the impact of information on public 
attitudes toward the science, ethics, regulation and potential applications of gene 
therapy.  The study began in 1999 with a baseline survey of attitudes and then, over 
the period of about a year, respondents were given information relating to gene 
therapy, first in the form of a magazine and then, some months later, by video and 
group discussion. Participants were re-interviewed six months after the baseline 
survey, following exposure to this information, to assess the impact it had on their 
attitudes. Analyses of the panel data found some, but not all, of the interventions 
were associated with change in public attitudes (Wellcome Trust, forthcoming). 
Respondents who attended group discussions and watched the video became 
generally more positive about human genetic research. However, at the same time, 
their reservations increased for specific applications, such as germ-line therapy, and 
for treatment of specific non-medical conditions such as baldness. No significant 
relationships were found between general attitudes to gene therapy and reading the 
gene therapy magazine after taking into account differences between those who 
chose to read it and those who did not. Providing information in written form 
appears to have been more effective in increasing knowledge and reassurance about 
regulation of gene therapy than it was in changing people‟s opinions. Over the 
course of the panel, the provision of any kind of information served to increase the 
public‟s engagement with genetics and to some extent their knowledge.  Out of nine 
factual knowledge questions, the mean number answered correctly increased from 
4.83 in the baseline survey to 5.19 just over a year later in the final wave of the panel. 
The notion that providing specific relevant information to lay members of the 
public can change opinions is also supported by research focused on group 
discussions. A study by the Wellcome Trust questioned the public about their 
                                                 
1 The scale was formed by scoring as „correct or „incorrect‟, responses to questions about the 
degree to which particular traits are determined by genes or by environment; the answers to 
several of which are highly contested. 
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opinions on human cloning before providing them with factual information on the 
scientific processes and regulation involved (Wellcome Trust, 1998). When re-
convened up to a month later to assess how, if at all, this information had modified 
their attitudes, it was found that concerns about reproductive cloning persisted but 
that attitudes towards therapeutic cloning had changed. However, rather than 
promoting more favourable attitudes, better informed respondents in this study 
became more critical and reserved about its application. These latter studies suggest 
that information is unlikely to allay public resistance to genetic technologies if it 
means people begin to raise and question issues that they had not, hitherto, thought 
about.   
In this paper we use a regression-based modelling technique which provides 
estimates of what opinion might look like if the public were better informed about 
the issues in question (Bartels, 1996; Delli-Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Althaus, 1998; 
2001; Gilens 2001; Sturgis, 2003). Using nationally representative British survey data, 
and taking into account the influence of a wide range of socio-demographic 
characteristics, we show the magnitude and direction of „information effects‟ at both 
the aggregate and individual level on a range of general and specific attitudes 
towards biotechnology. We frame our analysis with regard to two primary working 
hypotheses. If we accept the general critique of the deficit model of public 
understanding of science then we would not expect general scientific knowledge to have a 
positive effect on public attitudes towards biotechnology, net of other factors.  Second, we 
examine the possibility that the specificity of information that people possess may 
additionally shape how they reach an opinion (Gilens, 2001). Someone who scores 
highly on general science knowledge questions is likely to draw on an amalgam of 
information that is wide-ranging and diffuse. Hence, it is possible that very little of 
this information will pertain to genetic science at all.  It does not necessarily follow, 
therefore, that those who are well-informed about science in general will also be 
knowledgeable about the science underpinning biotechnology. If the degree of 
specificity of scientific knowledge is important, then, we should expect a domain specific 
measure of scientific knowledge to have a stronger influence than a general measure in 
determining opinion.  
 
 13 
DATA AND MEASURES 
We use two different data-sets as the focus of our analysis in this paper; the 2000 
British Social Attitudes Survey and the 1999 Wellcome Consultative Panel on Gene 
Therapy.  These data-sets were chosen because the former can be used to derive a 
measure of general scientific knowledge, while the latter measures knowledge more 
specific to genetics. 
The British Social Attitudes Survey uses a multi-stage, stratified random 
sample design to obtain a nationally representative sample of adults aged 18 and 
over resident in private households in Great Britain. In the 2000 survey, a total of 
3426 adults were interviewed, an overall response rate of 62 percent (Park et al. 
2001). The survey design meant that three different versions of the questionnaire 
were administered, each with its own self-completion section, to approximately one-
third of the sample. Two thirds of the sample were asked a module of questions on 
genetics (N=2258). A battery of six questions, used here to assess respondents‟ 
knowledge of general science, was administered via self-completion to one-third of 
the sample (N=1134). With a response rate of 86% for these self-completion 
questions, this analysis is based on a weighted sample2 of 976 respondents who 
answered questions about general science and attitudes to genetics. 
We examine questions on general attitudes towards science and towards 
genetic research. In addition, a number of specific applications of genetic technology 
are covered: the use of genetic data by an employer or insurance company, gene 
therapy, abortion and pre-implantation genetic diagnosis. The majority of questions 
had 5-point ordinal response scales.  These were dichotomised so that all responses 
that could be seen as consistent with a pro-science or pro-biotechnology position 
were coded 1, all other responses zero (see appendix for wording of individual 
items). None of the six items in the battery of knowledge questions related 
specifically to genes or genetics. Respondents were given statements on topics that 
included the greenhouse effect, exposure to radioactivity and man-made chemicals, 
and asked to rate each on a 5 point scale ranging from „definitely true‟ to „definitely 
not true‟ (see appendix for wording of items). To construct a measure of general 
scientific knowledge, responses on each item that were definitively correct were 
scored +1 and all other answers (including a more tentative „probably correct‟ 
response) were coded zero. The six items were then summed to produce a 7-point 
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scale ranging from zero to six (Cronbach‟s Alpha = 0.66). A histogram of knowledge 
scores is presented in the Appendix. 
In 1999, the Wellcome Trust commissioned a consultative panel survey on 
attitudes to gene therapy to assess how the provision of information affects public 
opinion on this application of genetic technology.  Our analysis uses data from the 
baseline survey of public attitudes based on a representative sample of adults aged 
18 and over in Great Britain.   A total of 696 interviews were achieved for this survey, 
representing a response rate of 58 percent (Stratford, White & Park, 2002). 
As well as gauging the general attitudes of the public towards science and 
genetic science, questions in the survey also probed respondents about particular 
applications of gene therapy they found acceptable or unacceptable.   Scenarios were 
developed for different medical conditions ranging from cystic fibrosis to baldness.  
For each medical condition, respondents were questioned about their attitudes 
towards the use of somatic gene therapy (where changes made to genes would not 
be inherited by any future children), germ-line gene therapy (where changes would 
be inherited) and in-utero therapy (where changes would be made before birth but 
could not be inherited).  Appraisals were based on whether each application should 
be „definitely allowed‟ through to „definitely not allowed‟. For these items and for 
expressed agreement or disagreement with general attitude statements, responses 
were dichotomised so that all responses that could be seen as consistent with a pro-
science or pro-biotechnology position were coded 1, all other responses zero (see 
appendix for wording of individual items). 
The survey included a battery of nine factual questions, relating specifically 
to biology and genetics, to which respondents gave a true or false answer.  To 
construct an additive measure of genetic knowledge for this analysis, correct 
responses on each item were scored 1 and all other answers (including „don‟t know‟) 
were coded zero. Raw scores on the summed scale range from zero, when none of 
the nine questions were answered correctly, to nine for a fully correct set of 
responses (Cronbach‟s Alpha =0.51)3. A histogram of scale scores is presented in the 
appendix. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
2
 Data weighted to reflect the probability of selection of addresses, households and individuals. 
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ANALYSIS 
We examine how knowledge in the domains of general science and genetic science 
are related to attitudes toward biotechnology using a regression-based modeling 
technique.  This technique was developed in political science to investigate the 
impact of political knowledge on issue and vote preferences (Bartels, 1996; Delli-
Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Althaus, 1998; 2001; Gilens 2001; Sturgis, 2003).  It provides 
statistical estimates of how public opinion might look if everyone shared a higher (or 
lower) level of relevant formal knowledge. In accordance with Althaus (1998; 2001), 
Gilens (2001) and Sturgis (2003) the simulation models are logit regressions with the 
following structure: 
 
Ln (P/(1-P)) = α + ß1 Ii + ∑ßk Dik + ∑δk (Ii*Dik) + ei 
 
Where Ln (P/(1-P))  is the log of the odds of being in category 1 of a binary variable 
indicating respondent endorsement of an attitudinal proposition; Ii is respondent i‟s 
level of scientific knowledge; Dik is respondent i‟s score on the kth socio-demographic 
variable; Ii*Dik is the interaction of respondent i‟s level of scientific knowledge with 
their score on the kth socio-demographic variable; and ei is the error of prediction.  ß1, 
ßk and δk are the respective regression coefficients for the main effects and the 
interaction terms of knowledge and socio-demographic variables. 
The analysis proceeds in three stages.  First, a logistic regression model is 
fitted to predict the likelihood of a favourable attitude toward biotechnology using 
just demographic variables as predictors. At stage two, the knowledge variable and 
interactions between this variable and all demographic variables are added to the 
model. The interaction terms allow for the possibility that the direction of the 
relationship between knowledge and attitude varies across individuals and groups.  
At this stage we should observe a significant improvement in model fit (as indicated 
by the difference in Likelihood Ratio between the two nested models) if knowledge is 
significantly related to attitude. At the third stage, predicted probabilities are run out 
from the parameters estimated at stage two, but with knowledge scores changed to 
the highest possible score on the scale for all respondents. These predicted 
                                                                                                                                            
3 While this is below the traditional 0.7 benchmark of acceptable scale reliability, a 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis reveals that a one factor model fits the data well, according to 
conventional fit indices. 
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probabilities can then be compared to those from the model with unadjusted 
knowledge scores at both the individual and aggregate level.  The difference between 
the two figures provides a measure of how individual and collective opinion might 
look if everyone were as well-informed as the currently best informed members of 
the population. 
The following socio-demographic covariates were included in the models 
fitted to both data-sets: age (years); gender; educational qualifications; social class; 
parental status; reported genetic illness in the family; self-reported long-term 
disability or illness; religion and current employment status. These covariates cover 
many of the characteristics found to be associated with the distribution of scientific 
and genetic knowledge (Durant et al. 1992; Miller, 1998; Midden et al. 2002; Gaskell 
et al. 2003a).  Following Bartels (1996) and Sturgis (2003), more proximal attitudinal 
variables, which might improve overall model fit, were omitted as covariates in the 
models as these are likely themselves to be partially determined by scientific 
knowledge.   
 
RESULTS 
First we consider the results of the models fitted to the British Social Attitudes 
Survey data. Table 1 shows 25 attitudinal items from the BSA, with the percentage of 
respondents who endorsed a view that can be seen as broadly favourable towards 
biotechnology in column 2.  The estimated proportion of the sample who adopt the 
same viewpoint under full information4 is given in column 3 and the magnitude and 
direction of the change in opinion in column 4.  Statistically significant „knowledge 
effects‟ at the 95% confidence level or below are indicated by an asterisk adjacent the 
change score in column 4. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The table shows significant shifts in opinion for 10 out of the 25 (40 percent) 
items examined under full general scientific knowledge. Taken together, the average 
magnitude of aggregate change across all 25 items in table 1 is 10 percent, with the 
majority of items changing by 10 percent or less under full information.  In 20 out of 
                                                 
4 We use the term „full information‟ to denote opinions estimated assuming the top score on 
the science knowledge measure. 
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25 items (80%), informed opinion became more favourable, that is, people expressed 
a view that can be interpreted as more supportive of science, biotechnology or its 
applications.  However, in only 8 of these 20 items were the changes statistically 
significant (p<0.05). Of these, most notable were the strong positive shifts in general 
attitudes towards science (items 1a and 1b).  The largest shift in opinion was found 
for item 1d, namely, „research into human genes does more harm than good‟ where 
disagreement with this proposition increased from 48 percent to a majority of 80 
percent when opinion was „fully informed‟.  
Similar changes, though of smaller magnitude, were evident for specific 
applications of genetic technologies. In all four items relating to Pre-implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis (PGD), a technique whereby embryos created by in-vitro 
fertilisation are genetically screened prior to implantation in the womb, informed 
opinion became more favourable. Under full information, a majority endorsed this 
technique as a way of preventing serious mental or physical disability in children 
(items 4a and 4b).  The magnitudes of these changes were generally large (15% or 
more) and all were statistically significant.  The pattern of change was similar for 
attitudes to abortion as a result of genetic tests conducted on foetuses (3a to 3d in 
table 1).  Simulating full scientific knowledge showed a majority condoning the use 
of abortion for serious mental or physical disability diagnosed in a foetus.  Informed 
opinion was also more tolerant toward the abortion of a foetus that would become a 
healthy child but die early (item 3c) or grow no taller than an 8-year old (item 3d). 
Only in the last of these items, however, was opinion change statistically significant. 
Simulating better informed opinion did not, though, have a uniformly 
positive effect on attitudes towards biotechnology.  Items relating to uses of genetic 
data generally had less public support under full information. Informed opinion was 
more strongly against the use of genetic data by insurance companies (item 2a) and 
the right of employers to have access to the genetic test results of employees (item 
2b), but not the right of employers to make job applicants take genetic tests (item 2c).  
Under full information, respondents were less likely to endorse the right of 
employers to compel employees to undergo genetic tests to assess their sensitivity to 
workplace chemicals, but at 72 percent, this retained the support of the clear 
majority. Information effects for attitudes to gene therapy tended to be small, with 
six out of nine items showing a change of 5 percent or less and none significantly 
different from zero at the 95% level of confidence or below. In general, changes were 
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in a positive direction; with opinion moving to a more favourable position in all but 
two items.  
Overall, then, these models show that general scientific knowledge does 
appear to influence the favourability of opinion toward genetic science and its 
applications. In the majority of items analysed, informed opinion became more 
favourable toward genetic research, although most of these shifts in opinion were 
rather modest in magnitude. However, general scientific knowledge did not have a 
uniform impact across all contexts; informed opinion showed a marked increase in 
support for techniques that prevent or treat specified medical conditions but a more 
negative appraisal of the wider uses of human genetic information.     
 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 1, of course, shows only how informed opinion might look at the aggregate 
level. However, because equivalent increases in knowledge can shift individual level 
opinion in opposite directions, it is likely that many of these aggregate effects mask a 
good deal of opinion change at the individual level. This is because people moving in 
opposite directions on these attitude measures will cancel one another out, reducing 
the apparent overall level of opinion change as a result of increased knowledge. 
Table 2 shows the average magnitude of opinion change at the individual level for 
each item that was statistically significant in Table 1 along with the percentage that 
became more positive or more negative on each item under full information5.   
Two important things should be noted from Table 2: first, individual level 
change is typically greater than that found in the aggregate; second, individual level 
opinion becomes both more positive and more negative under full information on all 
but one of the items examined. For attitudes towards the use of genetic data, for 
instance, Table 2 shows that relatively modest aggregate changes in opinion can 
mask considerable individual level volatility.  Agreement that employers should 
have the right to see a genetic test of an employee (item 2d) decreased by 5 
percentage points in the aggregate but the mean amount of change at the individual 
level for this item was more than double this, at 12 percent. 
 
                                                 
5 Note, these proportions do not sum to 100% because on all items some respondents showed 
no opinion change. 
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However, Table 2 also shows that, on a number of items, individual level 
change was very similar to that found in the aggregate. For, example, general 
attitudes towards science and biotechnology (items 1a, 1b) showed only 1-2% more 
change at the individual level than they did in the aggregate and approximately 90% 
of opinion change was positive.  This suggests that the magnitude of aggregate level 
information effects is determined as much by the direction of the knowledge-attitude 
relationship across social groups, as it is by the strength of the relationship per se. 
  Next, we turn to a consideration of the results of the models fitted to the 
Wellcome data, where we use a domain-specific measure of genetic knowledge as 
opposed to a measure of general scientific knowledge. The 23 attitudinal items listed 
in this table all relate to general and specific attitudes toward different applications 
and contexts of gene therapy.    
 
INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
Table 3 shows significant shifts in opinion for 10 out of the 23 (46%) items examined 
in the Wellcome data. Nearly three-quarters of these changes were of 10 percentage 
points or less, with the average magnitude of aggregate change across all items being 
9 percent. Increased knowledge of genetics had a positive impact on all of the more 
general attitude items (1a to 1n).  That is, with a high level of genetic knowledge, 
respondents were more likely to agree with the general idea that genetic science will 
improve lives and should be encouraged by society and to disagree with arguments 
to the contrary.  The magnitude of these information effects did, however, vary quite 
considerably.  The largest effect was for the item „changing genes should be 
forbidden as tampering with nature‟ with 26 percent more respondents disagreeing 
with this statement under full information.   It is notable that for this item and other 
general attitudes where the magnitude of change was 15% or above (1a, 1h and 1j), 
the baseline percentage already shows majority support.  In no instance did informed 
opinion change the majority viewpoint to show a switch in collective preference - 
these attitudinal propositions already had a high level of public endorsement. In 
contrast, however, the baseline percentage supporting the testing of new genetic 
treatments on children was low (14%) but significantly increased to one-quarter of 
respondents under full information.  So, quite large changes in opinion were evident 
across a broad range of baseline, or starting values.  
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Items 2a to 2i in Table 3 focus on public attitudes to applications of gene 
therapy and distinguish between somatic therapy, germ-line and in-utero therapy. 
Respondents were asked about the acceptable uses of gene therapy for three named 
conditions - cystic fibrosis, heart disease and baldness - permitting comparison of the 
information effects for conditions of differing severity and impact on the individual. 
Although the information effects on these items were generally small in magnitude - 
6 out of the 9 items changed 5 percent or less, there was some indication that a more 
knowledgeable public would be more supportive of gene therapy for the more 
serious conditions of heart disease and cystic fibrosis but not for the far from life- 
threatening condition of baldness. Indeed, none of the items relating to gene therapy 
for baldness showed an increase in favourability under full information and two 
showed a decline in support, though these were non-significant. 
 Table 4 shows that, as with the models fitted to the BSA data, the statistically 
significant changes in aggregate opinion under full information conceal considerable 
individual level change. Average change scores across items were 15% and 20% at 
the aggregate and individual levels respectively. Although the majority of opinion 
change was in a positive direction, all items showed some degree of movement in 
both a more favourable and a more negative direction.  Being more knowledgeable 
about biology and genetics does not therefore have a uni-directional effect on 
attitudes, but causes opinion to move in a more negative or more positive direction, 
depending on the issue and the social location of the individual.  
 
INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
How do these effects for a domain specific knowledge measure compare with those 
found for general scientific knowledge in the BSA data? A straightforward 
comparison is not, of course, possible as we are dealing with different sample sizes 
and different attitudinal dependent variables in each data set. These reservations 
notwithstanding, though, the pattern of results is remarkably similar across studies. 
Simulating full information produced statistically significant shifts in opinion on 
approximately 40 percent of the items examined using either a domain specific or a 
general measure of scientific knowledge. Similarly, the majority of items became 
more favourable toward genetic science in both the Wellcome and the BSA data and 
the average aggregate change figures across all items were almost identical at 
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approximately 10% and 9% respectively. Overall then, there appears to be little to 
discriminate between the effects of these two different measures of scientific 
knowledge; both seem reliably related to public attitudes, moving opinion in a 
predominantly more favourable direction and both exert considerably greater 
influence on individual level opinions than they do in the aggregate. 
 
DISCUSSION 
The accepted wisdom in sociological treatments of public opinion toward science 
and technology has come to be that what individuals and groups „know‟ about 
science is unrelated to the preferences they express. Indeed, the idea that attitudes 
are underpinned by scientific knowledge (or ignorance) has come under such 
sustained attack of late that the Third House of Lords report on Science and 
Technology (2000) concluded that the term „public understanding of science‟ should 
be dropped from future funding initiatives. In many ways, this springs from a 
wholly appropriate reaction to a longstanding and patronising view of citizens 
which casts resistance to technological „innovation‟ as based on ignorance, 
superstition and fear. In the light of recent sociological work in this area, it is clearly 
no longer legitimate for scientists and policy makers to assert that public opposition 
to new technologies emanates from a lack of understanding of the underlying 
scientific „facts‟. The extant literature on what is now becoming known by the more 
neutral moniker of „science in society‟ is replete with empirical demonstrations that 
to concentrate solely on scientific knowledge overlooks other, more important 
determinants of public attitudes toward science and technology.  
We do not seek here to disagree with this general position but argue instead 
that the empirical evidence does not support so strong a rejection of scientific 
knowledge as a factor which serves to, at least partially, shape and mould the 
distribution of opinion toward science. Across two different, nationally 
representative data sets, we find statistically significant „information effects‟ on 
approximately half of the nearly fifty different items examined. These effects are, of 
course, net of other important determinants of public attitudes such as, inter alia, age, 
sex, education and social class.  We do not present these covariates as an exhaustive 
list of all possible determinants of attitudes to genetic science; our goal here is not to 
maximise the explanatory power of our model but to examine how scientific 
knowledge impacts on attitude within a broad range of more or less fixed 
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demographic characteristics.  We purposely excluded from our analysis other, more 
psychological variables such as trust and risk perception (Priest, Bonfadelli and 
Rusanen, 2003), that may themselves moderate the knowledge-attitude relationship, 
as these are likely themselves to be partially determined by knowledge.  The 
exclusion of such variables means that our estimates of „informed opinion‟ must be 
treated with some caution and should not simply be considered as straightforward 
estimates of what a better informed public would think on specific aspects of 
genomic science and technology.  In future work we aim to extend this analysis to 
focus on how these more proximal variables impact on the findings we have 
presented here. 
These reservations notwithstanding, the over-riding direction of opinion 
change in these models was in a direction more favourable toward science in general 
and biotechnology in particular. That is to say, these results should lead us to expect 
a more scientifically knowledgeable public to be broadly more positive about science 
and the biotechnology applications examined here, all of which pertain to human 
genomics. This conclusion must be qualified by two important caveats; on several 
issues informed opinion became more oppositional and on almost all items the 
direction of opinion change was not uni-directional at the individual level. The latter 
point is often overlooked or misunderstood in critiques of analyses which point to a 
positive relationship between knowledge and attitude. A positive correlation should 
not lead us to conclude that more knowledge will lead to more favourable attitudes 
in all individuals. Indeed, the evidence presented here should lead us to quite the 
opposite conclusion. However, in any analysis of preference change on a single 
dimension over time, individuals moving in opposite directions will cancel each 
other out, with the majority movers appearing to „win‟ in the aggregate. So, while 
knowledge appears to affect different individuals‟ attitudes in different ways, the 
general pattern in the items we have examined here suggests that the dominant 
direction of movement is toward increased support of science and biotechnology. 
Our choice of biotechnology as the focus of these analyses was quite 
deliberate; public knowledge is low and opposition high in most contexts in which it 
has been studied. A strong candidate, therefore, for claims – and counter-claims – 
that resistance to its associated applications and technologies is rooted in ignorance 
of the underlying science. Furthermore, by focussing on a specific area of modern 
science, rather than science in general, we can be more confident that our findings 
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relate to real citizen preferences toward the practices which together constitute the 
field of modern genetic science, as opposed to symbolic responses to some abstract 
notion of „science‟. Our findings, then, lead us to conclude that knowledge of science, 
whether at a more general or a domain specific level, is one of a number of important 
determinants of public attitudes toward applications of biotechnology  that focus on 
human genomics. And, while we would not wish to endorse a return to a naive 
deficit model of public understanding, we would contend that an outright rejection 
of a role for scientific knowledge is, perhaps, as empirically myopic as the position it 
sets out to critique. 
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APPENDIX 
 
1.  2000 British Social Attitudes Survey (BSAS) 
Wording & Coding of Items in measure of General Scientific Knowledge  
1. Antibiotics can kill bacteria but not viruses (true). 
2. Human beings developed from earlier species of animals (true). 
3. All man-made chemicals can cause cancer if you eat enough of them (false). 
4. If someone is exposed to any amount of radioactivity, they are certain to 
die as a result (false). 
5. The greenhouse effect is caused by a hole in the earth‟s atmosphere (false). 
6. Every time we use coal or oil or gas, we contribute to the greenhouse effect 
(true). 
 
Response options for these questions were: definitely true; probably true; probably 
not true; definitely not true or can‟t choose.   Correct answers are given next to each 
question above.  Only definitively correct responses were scored + 1, all other 
answers (including non-substantive responses and item non-responders) were coded 
zero.   Items were then summed to produce a 7-point scale ranging from 0 to 6.  
Figure A1 shows the distribution of knowledge scores on this measure. 
 
Wordings & Coding of Attitude Items 
Response categories for the following items were: strongly agree; agree; neither agree 
nor disagree; disagree and strongly disagree. Dichotomies were formed by coding 
responses consistent with a pro-science/biotechnology position as 1, all other 
responses 0. 
 
General Attitudes 
 Item 1a: [Disagree that] we believe too often in science and not enough in 
feelings and faith. 
 Item 1b: [Disagree that] overall, modern science does more harm than good. 
 Item 1c: [Agree that] people at risk of having a child with a serious genetic 
disorder should not start a family. 
 Item 1d: [Disagree that] research into human genes will do more harm than 
good. 
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Use of Genetic Data 
Response categories for the following items were:  definitely should; probably 
should; don‟t know; probably should not; definitely should not.   Dichotomies were 
formed by coding „definitely should‟ and „probably should‟ as 1, all other responses 
0. 
People can take genetic tests to tell them whether they are likely to develop a 
serious genetic condition in the future.  In your opinion…  
 Item 2a: [Agree genetic tests should be used] by insurance companies to 
accept or refuse people for life insurance policies. 
 Item 2b: [Agree the employer should] have the right to see the result of this 
test. 
 Item 2c: [Agree the employer should] have the right to make [job] applicants 
have a test. 
 Item 2d: [Agree the employer should] have the right to make applicants have 
a test to see if they are particularly sensitive to chemicals that may be used in 
the workplace. 
 
Abortion and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis (PGD) 
Response categories for the following items were: always right; sometimes right and 
never right.   Dichotomies were formed by coding „always right‟ as 1, other responses 
0. 
 
[Agree] it would be always right for the woman to have a legal abortion if the child 
was very likely to … 
 Item 3a: be born with a serious mental disability and would never be able to 
live an independent life. 
 Item 3b: be born with a serious physical disability and would never be able to 
live an independent life. 
 Item 3c: be born with a condition that meant it would live in good health, but 
then would die in its twenties or thirties. 
 Item 3d: be healthy but would never grow taller than an eight year old. 
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There is another way in which couples can try and avoid having a child with a 
serious medical condition.  The woman‟s eggs are fertilised outside her body with 
her partner‟s sperm and genetically tested.  Only eggs without the condition are put 
back and may then grow into a baby.  Suppose it was likely that a couple would have 
a child … 
 with a serious mental disability (item 4a). 
 with a serious physical disability (item 4b). 
 which would live in good health but then would die in its twenties or thirties 
(item 4c). 
 which would be healthy but would never grow taller than an eight year old 
(item 4 d). 
 
Gene Therapy 
Response categories for these items were: definitely allowed; probably allowed; 
probably not allowed; definitely not allowed.  Dichotomies were formed by coding 
„definitely allowed‟ and „probably allowed‟ as 1, all other responses 0. 
 
Suppose it was discovered that a person‟s genes could be changed.  Do you 
think that this should be allowed or not allowed to … 
 make a person taller or shorter (item 5a) 
 make a person more intelligent (item 5b) 
 make a person straight, rather than gay or lesbian (item 5c) 
 reduce a person‟s chances of getting heart disease (item 5d) 
 make a person of average weight, rather than very overweight (item 5e) 
 determine the sex of an unborn baby (item 5f) 
 to give someone a full head of hair, rather than being bald (item 5g) 
 to stop someone having schizophrenia (item 5h) 
 to make them less aggressive or violent (item 5i). 
 
2.  Wellcome Consultative Panel on Gene Therapy (1999) 
Wordings & Coding of Items in measure of Genetic Knowledge 
 
1. Identical twins have the same genes (true) 
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2. There are test tube babies who grew entirely outside the mother‟s body 
(false) 
3. Genes of all living things on earth are made up of different combinations of 
only 4 or 5 chemical building blocks (true). 
4. Down‟s Syndrome is an inherited disease (true) 
5. Children look like their parents because they share the same type of red 
blood cells (false) 
6. Half your genes come from your mother and half from your father (true) 
7. Whether a couple have a girl or a boy depends on the woman‟s genes (false) 
8. We have around 150,000 different chromosomes which contain our genes 
(false) 
9. Most cells in our body contain a copy of all our genes (true). 
 
Response options for these questions were: true, false or don‟t know.   Correct 
answers are given next to each question above.   Correct answers were scored + 1, all 
other answers (including non-substantive responses and item non-responders) were 
coded zero.   Items were then summed to produce a 10-point scale ranging from 0 to 
9. Figure A2 shows the distribution of knowledge scores on this measure.  
 
Wordings & Coding of Attitude Items 
Response categories for the following items were: agree strongly; agree; neither agree 
nor disagree; disagree and disagree strongly. Dichotomies were formed by coding 
responses consistent with a pro-science/biotechnology position as 1, all other 
responses 0. 
 
 [Disagree] overall, modern science does more harm than good (item 1a). 
 [Agree] science and technology make our lives healthier, easier and more 
comfortable (item 1b). 
 [Disagree] science makes our way of life change too fast (item 1c). 
 [Agree] genetic treatments for illness will do a lot to reduce human suffering 
(item 1d). 
 [Disagree] changing a person‟s genes is too risky, whatever the benefits might 
be (item 1e). 
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 [Disagree] it is better to try to cure illness without changing people‟s genes 
(item 1f). 
 [Agree] that in the end, research into human genes will do more to help us 
than to harm us (item 1g). 
 [Disagree] it would be better if we did not know how to change people‟s 
genes at all (item 1h). 
 [Agree] people worry too much about the risk of changing human genes 
(item 1i). 
 [Disagree] we should never interfere with people‟s genes (item 1j). 
 [Disagree] scientists should not look for genetic cures because the world will 
become too overpopulated (item 1k). 
 [Disagree] changing genes should be forbidden as it is tampering with nature 
(item 1l). 
 [Disagree] that rather than change the genes of disabled people we should 
provide facilities to make life easier for them (item 1m). 
 [Agree that it] should be allowed to test new genetic treatments on children 
(item 1n). 
 
Specific Applications of Gene Therapy 
The following questions were asked about heart disease, baldness and cystic 
fibrosis.   Response categories for these items were: definitely allowed; probably 
allowed; probably not allowed; definitely not allowed or it depends/need more 
information.  Dichotomies were formed by coding „definitely allowed‟ and 
„probably allowed‟ as 1, all other responses 0. 
 
I‟d like you to think of [someone in their 20s who has serious heart disease/ a man 
in his 20s who is bald and feels very embarrassed about it/ someone in their 20s born 
with cystic fibrosis].  Suppose it was discovered that changing some of their 
genes by giving them an injection could [help treat their heart disease/ help his 
hair to grow back/ help treat their cystic fibrosis].  These new genes would not be 
passed onto any children they might later have.  Do you think this should be 
allowed or not allowed?   (items 2a, 2d, 2g). 
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Now, what if the new genes were passed onto their future children [to give 
them less chance of getting serious heart disease in their 20s?/ so that they would not 
go bald in their 20s/  so that they would not have cystic fibrosis]. Do you think this 
should be allowed or not allowed? (items 2b, 2e, 2h). 
 
Now suppose a [person’s/ man’s] genes could be changed before they were 
born – by treatment while still in their mother‟s womb –[to give them less 
chance of getting serious heart disease in their 20s/ to stop him going bald in his 20s/ 
so they would not have cystic fibrosis].  The new genes would not be passed onto 
any children they later have. Do you think this should be allowed or not 
allowed? (items 2c, 2f, 2i). 
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Figure A1:    Histogram for measure of General Scientific Knowledge 
(BSAS) 
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Figure A2: Histogram for measure of Genetic Knowledge (Wellcome 
Panel) 
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Table 1: Information Effects for General Scientific Knowledge:  
Aggregate change: BSA 2000 
 
BSAS ITEM Actual 
% 
Simulated 
% 
Diff 
1. General Attitudes 
a Disagree that we believe 
too often in science, not 
enough in feelings & 
faith. 
 
19 
 
42 
 
+ 23* 
b. Disagree modern 
science does more harm 
than good. 
49 73 + 24* 
c. Agree people at risk of 
child with genetic 
disorder should not 
start family. 
41 43 + 2 
d. Disagree research into 
human genes does more 
harm than good. 
48 80 + 32* 
 
2.  Use of Genetic Data 
a. Agree tests used by 
insurance companies to 
set premiums. 
 
 
16 
 
 
13 
 
 
- 3 
b. Agree employers have 
right to see genetic test 
result. 
18 13 - 5* 
c. Agree employers have 
right to make applicants 
take genetic test. 
8 12 + 4 
d. Agree employers right 
to test sensitivity to 
83 72 - 11* 
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workplace chemicals. 
 
3. Abortion 
a. Agree abortion for 
serious mental 
disability. 
 
 
49 
 
 
60 
 
 
+ 11 
b. Agree abortion for 
serious physical 
disability. 
42 54 + 12 
c. Agree abortion for child 
that will die in its 20s or 
30s. 
16 22 + 6 
d. Agree abortion for 
healthy child no taller 
than 8 yr old. 
14 33 + 19* 
4.  Pre-Implantation Genetic 
Diagnosis (PGD) 
 
a. Agree PGD for serious 
mental disability. 
 
 
 
 
39 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
 
 
 
+ 13* 
b. Agree PGD for serious 
physical disability. 
38 53 + 15* 
c. Agree PGD for child 
that will die in its 20s or 
30s. 
29 52 + 23* 
d. Agree PGD for healthy 
child no taller than 8 
year old. 
27 49 + 22* 
 
5.  Gene Therapy 
a. Agree gene therapy to 
make someone taller or 
shorter. 
 
 
25 
 
 
33 
 
 
+ 8 
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b. Agree gene therapy to 
make someone more 
intelligent. 
21 24 + 3 
c. Agree gene therapy to 
make someone straight, 
rather than gay or 
lesbian. 
19 20 + 1 
d. Agree gene therapy to 
reduce chances of heart 
disease. 
67 73 + 6 
e. Agree gene therapy to 
make someone of 
average weight. 
40 44 + 4 
f. Agree gene therapy to 
determine sex of unborn 
baby. 
15 15 0 
g. Agree gene therapy to 
prevent baldness. 
23 26 + 3 
h. Agree gene therapy to 
stop schizophrenia. 
68 69 + 1 
i. Agree gene therapy to 
make less someone 
aggressive. 
58 51 -7 
All models control for:  age (years); sex; genetic illness in family; long-term 
disability/illness; religion; RG social class; employment status; children; educational 
qualifications.     
 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2000 
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Table 2: Information Effects for Scientific Knowledge: Individual-level 
change: BSA Data 
 
BSAS ITEM Actual 
% 
Simulated 
% 
Aggregate 
Change 
Absolute 
Individual 
Change  
%   
+ 
% 
 - 
1. General Attitudes 
a. Disagree 
believe too 
often in 
science, not 
enough in 
feelings or 
faith. 
 
19 
 
42 
 
23 
 
24 
 
89 
 
 
10 
b. Disagree 
modern 
science does 
more harm 
than good. 
 
49 
 
73 
 
24 
 
26 
 
93 
 
5 
d. Disagree 
research into 
human genes 
does more 
harm than 
good. 
 
48 
 
80 
 
32 
 
32 
 
98 
 
0 
2.  Use of Genetic 
Data 
b. Agree 
employers 
have right to 
see genetic 
test result. 
 
 
18 
 
 
13 
 
 
5 
 
 
12 
 
 
19 
 
 
79 
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d. Agree 
employers 
should test 
for 
sensitivity to 
workplace 
chemicals. 
 
83 
 
72 
 
11 
 
15 
 
29 
 
69 
3.  Abortion 
e. Agree 
abortion if 
healthy child 
never taller 
than 8 year 
old. 
 
 
14 
 
 
33 
 
 
19 
 
 
21 
 
 
 
74 
 
 
24 
4.  Pre-Implantation 
Genetic Diagnosis. 
a. Agree PGD 
for severe 
mental 
disability 
 
 
39 
 
 
52 
 
 
13 
 
 
16 
 
 
75 
 
 
23 
 
b. Agree PGD 
for severe 
physical 
disability. 
 
 
 
38 
 
 
 
53 
 
 
 
15 
 
 
 
18 
 
 
 
86 
 
 
 
13 
c. Agree PGD 
for child that 
will die in its 
20s or 30s. 
 
29 
 
52 
 
23 
 
24 
 
86 
 
13 
d. Agree PGD 
for healthy 
child never 
taller than 8 
 
27 
 
49 
 
22 
 
24 
 
84 
 
14 
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year old. 
 
All models control for:  age (years); sex; genetic illness in family; long-term 
disability/illness; religion; RG social class; employment status; children; educational 
qualifications.     
 
Source: British Social Attitudes Survey, 2000. 
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Table 3: Information Effects for Genetic Knowledge:  
  Aggregate change: Wellcome Data 
 
 
WELLCOME PANEL ITEM 
 
Actual  
% 
 
Simulated 
 % 
 
 
Diff 
1. General Attitudes 
a Disagree modern 
science does more harm 
than good. 
 
69 
 
85 
 
+ 16* 
b. Agree science & 
technology make lives 
healthier, easier and 
more comfortable. 
 
79 
 
82 
 
+ 3 
c. Disagree science makes 
our way of life change 
too fast. 
 
37 
 
47 
 
+ 10 
d. Agree genetic 
treatments will reduce 
human suffering. 
 
76 
 
84 
 
+8* 
e. Disagree changing 
genes is too risky 
whatever benefits 
27 41 + 14* 
f. Disagree better to cure 
illness without 
changing genes. 
11 18 + 7 
g. Agree research into 
human genes will do 
more to help us than 
harm us. 
13 14 + 1 
h. Disagree better if not 
know how to change 
58 77 + 19* 
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genes. 
i. Agree people worry too 
much about risk of 
changing genes. 
41 48 + 7* 
j. Disagree should never 
interfere with genes. 
52 72 + 20* 
k. Disagree scientists 
should not look for 
genetic cures as world 
will be overpopulated. 
68 80 + 12* 
l. Disagree changing 
genes should be 
forbidden as tampering 
with nature. 
 
60 
 
86 
 
+ 26* 
m. Disagree that, rather 
than change genes of 
disabled, should 
provide facilities for 
them. 
20 28 + 8 
n. Agree with allowing 
new genetic treatments 
on children. 
14 25 + 11* 
 
2.  Gene Therapy 
a. Allow somatic gene 
therapy for heart 
disease. 
 
 
82 
 
 
87 
 
 
+ 5* 
b. Allow germ therapy for 
heart disease. 
64 62 - 2 
c. Allow in-utero therapy 
for heart disease. 
49 59 + 10 
d. Allow somatic gene 
therapy for cystic 
91 96 + 5 
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fibrosis. 
e. Allow germ therapy for 
cystic fibrosis. 
80 85 + 5 
f. Allow in-utero therapy 
for cystic fibrosis. 
62 70 + 8 
g. Allow somatic gene 
therapy for baldness. 
64 64   0 
h. Allow germ therapy for 
baldness. 
41 40 - 1 
i. Allow in-utero therapy 
for baldness. 
20 14 - 6 
 
All models control for:  age (years); sex; genetic illness in family; long-term 
disability/illness; religion; RG social class; employment status; children; educational 
qualifications.     
 
Source: Wellcome Consultative Panel on Gene Therapy, 1999. 
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Table 4: Information Effects for Genetic Knowledge: Individual-level 
change: Wellcome Data 
 
WELLCOME PANEL 
ITEM 
Actual 
% 
Simulated 
% 
Aggregate 
Change 
Absolute 
Individual 
Change  
% 
 + 
%  
- 
1. General Attitudes 
a. Disagree 
modern 
science does 
more harm 
than good. 
 
69 
 
85 
 
16 
 
16 
 
88 
 
9 
d. Agree genetic 
treatments 
will reduce 
human 
suffering. 
 
76 
 
84 
 
8 
 
15 
 
82 
 
15 
e. Disagree 
changing 
genes is too 
risky 
whatever 
benefits. 
 
27 
 
41 
 
14 
 
19 
 
71 
 
25 
g. Disagree 
better not to 
know how to 
change genes. 
 
58 
 
77 
 
19 
 
22 
 
 
96 
 
1 
h. Agree people 
worry too 
much about 
risk of 
changing 
genes. 
 
41 
 
48 
 
7 
 
17 
 
59 
 
38 
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i. Disagree 
should never 
interfere with 
genes. 
 
52 
 
72 
 
20 
 
24 
 
85 
 
11 
j. Disagree 
scientists 
should not 
look for 
genetic cures 
as world will 
be 
overpopulate
d.  
 
68 
 
80 
 
12 
 
20 
 
78 
 
18 
k. Disagree 
changing 
genes should 
be forbidden 
as tampering 
with nature. 
 
60 
 
86 
 
 
26 
 
29 
 
97 
 
<1 
n. Agree with 
allowing new 
genetic 
treatments on 
children. 
 
14 
 
25 
 
 
11 
 
15 
 
68 
 
28 
2. Gene 
Therapy 
a. Allow somatic 
gene therapy 
for heart 
disease. 
 
82 
 
87 
 
5 
 
10 
 
75 
 
22 
All models control for:  age (years); sex; genetic illness in family; long-term 
disability/illness; religion; RG social class; employment status; children; educational 
qualifications.     
Source: Wellcome Consultative Panel on Gene Therapy, 1999. 
 47 
 
 
 
